

Its designed annual capacity is 137,000 TEU (containerised cargo) plus 868,000 tonne of general and bulk cargo. Yet Gwadar remains an "exit to the sea" for China, a key differentiator of Gwadar compared to Djibouti.īerthing space for three ships of 200m length and 50,000-tonne deadweight is present in Gwadar, and a turning basin permits a ship of maximum 295 m length. Its creation followed many years of commercial investment there, although China does not have to necessarily follow the Djibouti model when setting up more overseas bases. Commercial activity in Gwadar is quite limited with minimal vessel traffic and tenuous road transport links for the USD 248 million port project (of which China provided USD 198 million).Ĭhina's solitary military base in the Indian Ocean region is in Djibouti, commissioned in August 2017. Gwadar is just 400 km from the important Hormuz Strait, through which 40 per cent of Chinese imported oil flows.Ĭhina has been Gwadar's chief promoter and investor since 2002, with the port beginning operations in 2008. The dusty fishing town of 90,000 inhabitants in Pakistan's remote and volatile Balochistan is strategically located on the Arabian Sea. The second factor is that Gwadar helps anchor or stabilise western China, a region where Beijing feels vulnerable to Islamic agitation. In this respect, China does not need its Gwadar investment to create a monetary return, for it is a strategic investment. One is establishing direct transport links to the Indian Ocean via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Gwadar is important to Beijing for two reasons.
